We examine whether short-term financial reporting objectives related to executive compensation and employment horizons affect managers' decisions to undertake accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) versus open market repurchases (OMRs). In an ASR, the firm repurchases borrowed shares and simultaneously enters into a forward contract with an investment bank. This structure provides potential financial reporting advantages over OMRs in that earnings per share (EPS) benefits are recorded immediately (i.e., the reporting effects are "accelerated") while the actual share repurchases and potential costs associated with the forward contract are deferred to a future date. Consistent with this short-term focus, we find that firms are more likely to choose ASRs over OMRs when the repurchase is accretive to EPS, when annual bonus compensation is explicitly tied to EPS performance, when CEO horizons are short, and when CEOs are more entrenched. These results are robust to controlling for endogeneity in the decision to repurchase shares. In addition, we find no evidence that compensation committees adjust executive pay for the effects of the ASR. Overall, our results suggest that short-term financial reporting benefits are a significant determinant of decisions to undertake ASRs, consistent with theories of managerial myopia.
Introduction
While stock repurchases have recently soared in popularity and now represent the dominant form of cash payout (see Skinner 2008) , they have also come under increasing criticism in the financial press (e.g., Morgenson 2006; Shaw 2006; MacDonald 2007) .
The main thrust of the criticism relates to their use in boosting short-term earnings per share (EPS). More pointedly, a report by Audit Integrity (2007) argues:
"The most consistent benefit is that they tend to be good for management by producing the appearance of earnings growth where none may exist, while providing management with additional bonuses and compensation at those companies which reward executives for increased EPS."
In this paper, we empirically examine whether short-term financial reporting incentives related to executives' compensation contracts and employment horizons affect firms' decisions to undertake an innovative new form of stock buybacks -accelerated share repurchases (ASRs). In an ASR, the firm repurchases borrowed shares and simultaneously enters into a forward contract with an investment bank. This structure provides potential financial reporting advantages over typical open market repurchases (OMRs) in that earnings per share (EPS) benefits are recorded immediately (i.e., the reporting effects are "accelerated") while the actual share repurchases and potential costs associated with the forward contract component of the agreement are deferred to a future date. These transactions thus provide a powerful setting in which to examine whether assertions linking managerial myopia to repurchase decisions are valid. 1 Using a sample of actual stock repurchases from 2004 to 2006, we empirically examine the determinants of ASRs using a two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure that corrects for any self-selection bias related to the repurchase decision. In the first stage, we follow Dittmar (2000) and model the repurchases as a function of firm cash levels and cash flows, market-to-book ratio, leverage, dividend payout, firm size, stock price performance, and option usage. In the second stage, which is our primary focus, we model the decision to execute the repurchase as either an ASR or an OMR and include the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the first stage analysis to control for potential endogeneity problems.
Consistent with the "accelerated" reporting effects on EPS associated with ASRs, we find that short-term financial reporting incentives related to executives' compensation contracts and employment horizons are significant determinants of the decision to undertake ASRs. As expected, we find that firms are more likely to execute an ASR when the reporting effects are accretive to EPS and when firms' bonus compensation contracts explicitly reward executives on EPS performance. We also report evidence that short CEO horizons are a determinant of repurchase decisions --voluntary CEO turnover in the year following the repurchase is significantly higher for the firms that choose ASRs over OMRs. We also find that the ASR firms have CEOs that are more entrenched than the OMR firms, as measured by the frequency with which CEOs also hold a dual position as chairman of the board. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for repurchases, as well as other determinants of compensation structure and CEO turnover. Our findings suggest that the basic premise of the criticisms offered by guaranteed nature of the repurchase agreement. Some analysts hold similar views (e.g., McConnell, Pegg, Senyek, Mott, and Calingasan, 2006) . the financial press -that repurchases are often motivated by short-term reporting effects -has validity. More particularly, our results show that managerial myopia is more clearly linked to ASRs than to OMRs, consistent with our expectations.
We also present two additional analyses. First, we examine whether compensation committees adjust reported EPS for the effects of the ASRs when determining cash compensation levels. Using a model similar to Healy et al. (1987) , we find no evidence that compensation committees adjust reported EPS in setting executive pay, which is consistent with our finding of greater CEO entrenchment for firms that choose ASRs over OMRs.
Second, to address the issue of whether ASRs might impair firms in the long run, we examine quarterly operating performance over a six-quarter window, beginning with the quarter before the repurchase and ending four quarters after the repurchase. Using unadjusted data, we find that ASRs significantly underperform OMRs in every quarter; however, this finding does not hold when we adjust for industry and size. We thus cannot conclude that the use of ASRs damages the firm in the long run. This finding is consistent with those of Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkachatalam (2008) , who link managerial opportunism to poor corporate governance, but are unable to document a deterioration in future firm performance. This paper contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, we extend the literature on the use of stock repurchases as a potential earnings management tool. While prior work by Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) and Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) have shown that benchmark-beating is a significant determinant in the decision to undertake OMRs, we show that different incentives related to EPS reporting are at play in the decision to undertake ASRs. This finding is important in that it deepens our insight into managers' motivations behind basic financing decisions that affect the firm.
Our results also contribute more broadly to the literature that links executive compensation to corporate financing decisions. Compensation policies have been shown to affect firms' leverage ratios (Smith and Watts 1992; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 1997) and convertible debt choices (Marquardt and Wiedman 2005) . While prior literature has also related compensation policies to stock repurchases, this stream of research has tended to focus on the use of repurchases to offset potential dilution from stock option grants (Bens et al. 2003; Dittmar 2000) . In contrast, we document that the reliance on short-term EPS-based bonus contracts is a significant determinant of repurchase decisions.
In addition, our research contributes to the literature on managerial myopia. A number of studies have investigated the associations between short-term horizon incentives and suboptimal investment decisions (see, e.g., Narayanan 1985; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bebchuk and Stole 1993; Bushee 1998) , as well as accrual management (see Pourciau 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Reitenga and Tearney 2003) . Our evidence complements and extends these findings by documenting that stock repurchase decisions are associated with CEO employment horizons.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section describes ASR agreements in greater detail. We develop our hypotheses in Section 3 and discuss our research design in Section 4. Section 5 describes our sample selection process. We present results in Section 6 and conclude with Section 7.
Background on accelerated share repurchases
An ASR is an arrangement in which a company purchases a block of borrowed shares and simultaneously enters into a forward contract with an investment bank. The investment bank buys the company shares back in the open market over time, generally six months to one year, to replace the borrowed shares (see Figure 1) . The forward contract is typically settled at the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the contract period.
For financial reporting purposes, an ASR is treated as two separate transactions.
First, when the agreement is initiated, stockholders' equity is decreased by the number of shares repurchased times the current share price, and cash is decreased or a liability is increased by an equal amount; this affects EPS calculations (on a weighted-average basis) for the current period. In addition, any fees charged by the investment bank are expensed. Second, because the firm typically has the choice to settle the forward contract in either cash or shares, they are not required under current reporting standards to mark the forward contract to market.
2 Thus, there are no reporting effects associated with the forward until the settlement date, at which point the firm will deliver to (or receive from) the investment bank the difference between the VWAP and the stock price at the initiation date of the ASR. At settlement, the accounting treatment is to decrease cash (or increase liabilities) and to decrease equity, assuming the price of the company's stock has 2 The implicit assumption behind the lack of mark-to-market accounting for the forward contract is that the company intends to settle the forward contract in shares and therefore need not consider the change in the fair value of the forward contract in the calculation of net income. In reality, most ASR forward contracts are settled in cash.
increased. The repurchased shares may be kept in treasury or retired (see the Appendix for a numerical example of the accounting treatment for ASRs).
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A key difference in accounting treatments between ASRs and OMRs is the timing of the recognition of the decrease in shares outstanding. In an OMR, this decrease is recorded when shares are actually repurchased, while in an ASR, the financial reporting effects are based on the repurchase of borrowed shares, preceding actual share repurchases. Therefore, one advantage to ASRs is the accelerated financial reporting benefits. The disadvantage is that cash must be provided up front, and the firm must pay the average share value over the life of the contract regardless of the increase in share price. Firms do not have an option to discontinue repurchasing shares once the ASR has been entered into as they would with an OMR program. 
Hypothesis development
The unusual structure of ASRs, as outlined in the previous section, has piqued the interest of academic researchers. Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2008) This paper differs substantially in focus from the concurrent work on ASRs in that we concentrate on the role that financial reporting objectives play in the choice between an ASR and an OMR. In particular, we rely on two aspects of the ASR agreement in developing our hypotheses: 1) the financial reporting benefits are "accelerated" relative to OMRs in that the effect on EPS is recorded prior to the actual repurchase of shares in the open market over time; and 2) any cost associated with settlement of the forward contract is shifted to a future period and is recorded directly in equity, bypassing the income statement. 5 We predict that these features will make ASRs relatively more attractive to "myopic" managers, i.e., those with strong incentives to increase EPS in the short run. Our hypotheses below all relate to this basic tenet. 5 In an untabulated analysis, we examine final settlement costs for 45 ASR firms in our sample that disclosed this information. On average these firms make an additional cash payment to the investment bank at the end of the contract period that represents 5.7% of the original ASR cost; however, there is wide variation across firms. Further, the pattern of settlement strongly suggests that ASR firms are concerned with the financial reporting effects of the forward contract. We discuss this further in the results section.
Accretive EPS Effect
We predict that managers are more likely to choose ASRs over OMRs when the impact of the repurchase is accretive to EPS. One main advantage to an ASR is that the reporting effects are "accelerated" relative to the actual repurchase of shares. If the net effect of the repurchase does not increase reported EPS, the manager arguably has less to gain in choosing the ASR structure. While, in theory, OMRs could be sized such that they would have reporting effects equal in magnitude to ASRs, in practice, the vast majority of OMRs are not accretive to EPS. For example, Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) find that only 9% of OMRs in their sample increase reported EPS by one cent or more. 6 Our first hypothesis is thus as follows:
H1: Accretive EPS effects are positively associated with the decision to undertake an ASR versus an OMR.
EPS-Based Bonus Compensation
Prior research shows that the use of EPS-based bonuses affects firms' financing decisions. For example, Marquardt and Wiedman (2005) find that firms are more likely to structure convertible bond transactions to increase EPS when manager bonuses are 6 The relatively small effects of OMRs on reported EPS suggest that OMRs are well-suited as an EPS management tool when firms fall just short of an earnings benchmark -indeed, Hribar et al. (2006) empirically show that firms exploit OMRs' inherent flexibility by strategically timing OMRs when they "need a penny" to make an analyst forecast. While it is possible that firms also use ASRs to meet or exceed analyst forecasts, it is a relatively straightforward exercise to adjust expected EPS for the effects of the repurchase because the number of shares repurchased is known in advance with certainty; further, anecdotal evidence shows that managers themselves explicitly disclose the reporting effects of the ASR on future EPS, and analysts adjust their forecasts accordingly. For example, Rockwell Collins issued a press release on September 29, 2006, announcing an ASR of 4.7 million shares at an initial cost of $257 million.
The press release also included the following statement: "With the execution of this agreement, the company now expects fiscal year 2007 earnings per share in the range of $3.10 to $3.20, a 5 cent increase over the previously announced guidance range of $3.05 to $3. (2006) examine firms in the S&P 500 with negative cash flows prior to or during share repurchase programs and found that a greater percentage of the CEOs for these firms were rewarded on "per share" performance metric (43.11 percent) compared to S&P 500 firms as a whole (27.85 percent). They also found that bonuses were more likely paid out to the CEOs of these firms-88 percent of these CEOs received annual bonuses versus 78 percent of the S&P 500 firms and 37.5 percent received cash bonuses versus 22.2 percent of CEOs in the S&P 500. The authors conclude that share repurchase programs may be used to generate higher levels of EPS and EPS growth in order to increase payout of incentives.
We predict that firms with bonus compensation contracts that are explicitly based on EPS performance will be more likely to choose ASRs over OMRs. The immediate boost to EPS and the deferral of contract settlement costs to a future period makes ASRs a more attractive than OMR when executives are explicitly rewarded on short-term EPS performance. In addition, prior research has linked OMRs to firms' reliance on stock option compensation (see Bens et al. 2003; Kahle 2002; Dittmar 2000) , which tends to be negatively associated with cash-based compensation (see Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien 2000) . Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows:
H2: The use of bonus compensation contracts that explicitly reward EPS performance is positively associated with the decision to undertake an ASR versus an OMR.
Voluntary Turnover and the Horizon Problem
Prior research finds that executives make opportunistically-motivated decisions as their employment horizon decreases. For example, Dechow and Sloan (1991) H3: Voluntary CEO turnover in the year following the repurchase is positively associated with the decision to undertake an ASR versus an OMR.
Managerial Entrenchment
We hypothesize that CEOs will be best able to benefit from the accelerated financial reporting effects of an ASR if they have sufficient managerial power (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002) to influence board decisions and compensation arrangements. Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that managers can influence all facets of the pay-setting process, including the appointment or reappointment of directors who are less likely to challenge his/her compensation. Consistent with this theory of managerial power, Davila and Penalva (2006) find that firms with more entrenched executives are more likely to have compensation contracts that put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance, which are arguably easier to manipulate, than on market-based performance measures.
We also observe that compensation committees shield CEO pay from a variety of factors, including accounting choices related to inventory and depreciation methods (Healy, Kang and Palepu 1987) ; restructuring charges (Dechow, Huson and Sloan 1994) ; accounting losses (Gaver and Gaver 1998) ; strategic expenditures (Duru et al. 2002) ; merger and acquisition activity (Grinstein and Hribar 2004) ; and recurring operating expenses (Comprix and Muller 2006) . It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that boards might similarly ignore the effects of stock repurchases in determining executive compensation, particularly if managers are more entrenched. Our fourth and final hypothesis is thus stated as follows:
H4: Managerial entrenchment is positively associated with the decision to undertake an ASR versus an OMR.
Research design
We examine whether financial reporting objectives related to short-term executive compensation contracts and employment horizons affect stock repurchase decisions using a two-stage Heckman self-selection model. In the first stage, we model the manager's decision to repurchase shares; in the second stage, which is our main focus, we model the decision to execute an ASR versus an OMR after controlling for the effects of selfselection bias.
First stage analysis: Repurchase decision
We first estimate a tobit model of the decision to repurchase shares similar to Dittmar (2000) :
where REP t is the dollar volume of repurchases, defined as Compustat data item
Purchase of Stock minus any change in preferred stock from t-1 to t, divided by the prior year-end market value of equity and truncated at 1%; CFO is operating cash flows, divided by assets, at t-1; CASH is cash and cash equivalents, divided by assets, at t-1;
MKBK is the ratio of the market value of equity plus debt to the book value of assets at t-1; PAYOUT equals cash dividends divided by net income before extraordinary items at t-1; SIZE equals the log of total assets at t-1; RETURN is the one-year stock return from year-end t-2 to year-end t-1; LEV is defined as the difference between a firm's net debtto-asset ratio (where net debt equals debt minus cash) and the median net debt-to-asset ratio of all firms with the same two-digit SIC code at t- To test H1, where we predict that accretive EPS effects are positively associated with the ASR structure, we estimate the impact of the repurchase on diluted EPS for the fiscal quarter in which the repurchase occurs. We follow Hribar et al. (2006) and compare reported diluted EPS with an "adjusted" EPS that removes the effects of the repurchase.
Specifically, we add back (on a weighted-average basis) the shares repurchased to the 9 Dittmar's (2000) model includes an OPTIONS variable, defined as the percentage of shares outstanding held in reserve to cover stock options, as reported by Compustat. This variable is not available after 1998; we therefore include our DILUTION variable as an alternative measure of stock option reliance. One advantage of using this variable to measure dilution is that it includes the effects of all potentially dilutive securities on stock price, not only stock options. Dittmar (2000) also includes a takeover variable for a portion of her sample period. While we do not explicitly include takeover attempts in our model, we note that firm size, growth opportunities, and leverage, all of which are represented in equation 1, have been found to be negatively associated with the probability of takeover (see Palepu 1986 ). In addition, Akyol, Kim, and Shekhar (2009) To test H4, we create an indicator variable, COB, which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (COB), and zero otherwise. We choose this measure as it is well-documented in prior research that duality in CEO and COB leadership rules reflects managerial entrenchment and power. For example, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) find that dual roles are associated with longer tenure and higher compensation levels. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that CEOs who are also COB use their position to influence directors' compensation, potentially interfering with effective monitoring. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that M&A bonuses are positively related to shared CEO and COB roles -i.e., CEOs who also serve as COB receive significantly higher bonuses and engage in larger M&A deals. In addition, they find that compensation committees do not appear to adjust bonuses for the performance of the deal. To the extent that the duality in CEO and COB roles reflect managerial entrenchment, we expect a positive estimated coefficient on COB.
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We also control for other firm characteristics that might affect the choice between an ASR and an OMR. For example, it is possible that the same factors that motivate compensation policies also affect repurchase structure. One such variable is suggested by the 'informativeness principle,' which states that when a performance measure reflects the influence of factors other than the executive's actions, i.e., the performance measure is 'noisy,' firms will reduce the weight placed on that measure in CEO compensation 11 We use COB as our primary measure of managerial entrenchment because it is the most commonly used in the prior literature. However, in sensitivity tests, we also use CEO age and CEO tenure as additional measures of managerial entrenchment (see e.g. Berger et al. 1997; Davila and Penalva 2006) . Results are qualitatively similar.
packages (see Holmstrom 1979; Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) find support for this idea in that they find that firms with noisy accounting earnings relative to stock returns tend to rely more on stock option awards for compensation purposes. We thus expect that firms that rely on EPS-based compensation contracts will have earnings realizations that are less noisy relative to stock returns. We control for this effect by including in our model the variable NOISE, which is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation in return on assets to the standard deviation of stock returns, measured over the five-year period preceding the repurchase. We expect NOISE to be negatively associated with the likelihood of an ASR.
We also include the firm's marginal tax rate (MTR) as a control. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code eliminates the tax deductibility of non-performance based executive compensation over $1 million, and Balsam and Ryan (1996) show that compliance with 162(m) is positively associated with firms' marginal tax rates. 12 To ensure that our BONUS variable, which would qualify as performance-based compensation measure under the Code, is not confounded with a tax effect, we include MTR in our model. We use simulated marginal tax rates as calculated by Graham and Mills (2008) using financial statement data, which are highly correlated with marginal rates based on actual tax returns. 13 We expect MTR to be positively associated with the likelihood of an ASR.
12 On a related note, Perry and Zenner (2001) document increased pay-for-performance sensitivity for the firms affected by 162(m). More recently, Carter et al. (2008) find increased reliance on earnings information in bonus contracts in the post-SOX era. 13 We thank John Graham for providing data on marginal tax rates. When these data are not available, we use Graham and Mill's (2008) "PseudoStatutory" variable, which they show is a second-best alternative to their simulated rates.
We also control for alternative financial reporting objectives associated with stock repurchases. Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) 14 It could be argued that a number of the variables in equation 1 might also affect the decision to undertake an ASR versus an OMR. For example, Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2008) hypothesize that differences in firm size, cash levels, payout ratios, leverage, takeover measures, and valuation ratios could play a role in choosing between an ASR and an OMR. We effectively include these variables as controls by including the IMR from the first stage analysis in the second stage probit model. However, in sensitivity tests, we examine the robustness of our main analysis to inclusion of these variables as individual regressors in the second-stage model. 15 Estimation of equation (1) After eliminating observations with missing data, our final sample consists of 70 ASR firm-years and 201 OMR firm-years. 
Results

First stage analysis: Tobit model of repurchases
Second stage analysis: ASRs versus OMRs
In Table 2 , we present univariate results for our second-stage variables. As expected, the accretive effects to EPS are significantly greater for ASR firms, with the repurchase increasing reported EPS by one cent or more for 44.3% of the ASR firms versus 13.9% of the OMR firms (p=0.0001). In addition, a significantly higher proportion of ASR firms explicitly reward their executives on EPS performance than do OMR firms (57.5% vs. 30.0%, p=0.0001). We also document striking differences in We present Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients in Table 3 . The strongest pair-wise correlation is between STRING and SALESGROWTH (Spearman ρ = 0.228), which are both proxies for financial reporting incentives related to benchmark beating, followed by the correlation between ACCRETIVE and COB (ρ = 0.188), which suggests that entrenched managers may be more likely to undertake repurchases in order to secure financial reporting benefits. In general, however, the low correlation levels suggest that multicollinearity is not likely to be a major concern. 
Additional analysis: Effect on executive cash compensation
In our main tests, we implicitly assume that compensation committees do not adjust reported EPS for the effects of the ASR when setting executive pay. In this section, we directly examine the validity of this assumption. We estimate a cross-sectional model in which CEO cash compensation for the fiscal year of the repurchase is regressed on the change in reported EPS and the market value of equity. Following Healy et al. (1987) , we transform both cash compensation and firm size by taking natural logs of both variables so that their distributions more closely approach linearity. Our models are as follows:
Cash compensation is defined as the sum of annual salary and bonus; ΔEPS is defined as the difference between current and prior year diluted EPS, divided by the absolute value of prior year diluted EPS; ΔEPSASR is defined as the difference between diluted EPS for the current fiscal year, with the numerator adjusted for after-tax interest charges related to the repurchase and the denominator adjusted for the time-weighted number of shares repurchased, and prior year diluted EPS, divided by prior year diluted EPS; and Size is the (logged) market value of equity as of the fiscal year-end. We compare adjusted R 2 's across the two specifications using a Vuong Z-test. If compensation committees adjust reported EPS for the effects of the ASR, we should observe a higher adjusted R 2 in the second model (equation 4). We obtain cash compensation data from Execucomp when available; otherwise, we hand-collect the information from firms' proxy statements filed with the SEC. We examine both the CEO's cash compensation, as well as the sum of cash compensation for the top five executives of the firm.
Results are presented in Table 5 . In Panel A, we present descriptive statistics on cash compensation and EPS. Mean (median) CEO cash compensation in the fiscal year of the ASR is $1.886.0 ($1.261.3) million, which is slightly higher than the mean (median)
CEO cash compensation of $1.707 ($1.120) million for all Execucomp firms during our sample period. The average CEO bonus comprises almost one-third of total cash compensation, which is comparable to the average for Execucomp firms. Average cash compensation for the top five executives is slightly higher than the Execucomp average of $4.823 million. The average bonus for the top five executives in ASR firms comprises 31 percent of total cash compensation compared to 36 percent for all Execucomp firms.
The average cash compensation of the mean (median) diluted EPS is $2.646 ($2.380), which indicates that ASR firms are fairly profitable. When diluted EPS is adjusted for the effects of the ASR, the mean (median) figure is $2.589 ($2.372). The mean (median) percentage effect of the ASR on diluted EPS is 2.2% (1.1%), which is relatively large. In addition, mean (median) annual growth in diluted EPS is 20.1 percent (10.4 percent), but would be 16.4 percent (8.5 percent) if the ASR had not taken place.
Panel B presents the results from the OLS regressions. The adjusted R 2 's are similar across models and Vuong Z-tests comparing adjusted R 2 's from Models 1 and 2
and from Models 3 and 4 are not significant at conventional levels. Based on these findings, it does not appear that compensation committees adjust reported EPS for the effects of ASRs, consistent with the managerial entrenchment exhibited by firms that undertake these transactions. We caution, however, that our lack of results could also be due to low statistical power.
Additional analysis: Post-repurchase operating performance
To assess whether there are negative long-run consequences associated with ASRs, we compare the post-repurchase operating performance of ASRs versus OMRs.
We eliminate firms that are missing necessary accounting data on quarterly Compustat to compute performance-adjusted ROA. Similar to Lie (2005), we develop matched samples based on: 1) announcement year and quarter, 2-digit SIC code, and firm size as measured by total assets; and 2) announcement year and quarter, 2-digit SIC code, and performance as measured by return on assets (ROA) and market to book ratio (M/B) in the announcement quarter. We define performance as operating income scaled by cashdeflated assets at the beginning and end of the quarter.
We present results for the firms matched on industry and size in Table 6 (untabulated results for firms matched on performance measures are qualitatively similar). The sample size is limited due to both to the availability of an appropriate matching control firm and by the recency of our sample firms. In particular, firms that completed ASRs in 2006 would have little data available on quarterly Compustat with which to carry out the analysis.
As shown in Panel A, mean and median unadjusted ROA are significantly smaller for ASR firms in quarters -1 through +2. However, when operating performance is adjusted for industry and size, we no longer observe any significant differences between ASRs and OMRs. Similarly, in Panel B, where changes in operating performance are presented, no significant differences between the two groups are apparent. These findings suggest that either the choice between an ASR and OMR has no significant effects on future performance or, alternatively, that our small sample size does not allow us to detect underlying performance differences. Hence, we do not find conclusive evidence that the use of ASRs damages the firm in the long run. This finding is consistent with those of Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkachatalam (2008) , who link managerial opportunism to poor corporate governance, but are also unable to document a deterioration in future firm performance.
18 18 We also examined final settlement costs for 45 ASR firms in our sample that disclosed this information. Eight of these firms chose to settle the forward contract using shares, and 37 chose to settle in cash. Of the cash settlement firms, 33 had an increase in share price over the contract period and therefore had a further obligation to the investment bank, while none of the stock settlement firms had an increase and therefore
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine whether short-term financial reporting incentives related to executives' compensation contracts and employment horizons affect firms' decisions to undertake ASRs versus OMRs. We find that firms are more likely to choose
ASRs over OMRs when the repurchase is accretive to EPS, when annual bonus compensation is explicitly tied to EPS performance, when CEO horizons are short, and when CEOs are more entrenched. Importantly, our findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity in the decision to repurchase shares. Overall, these results suggest that short-term financial reporting benefits are a significant determinant of decisions to undertake ASRs, consistent with assertions in the financial press. These findings have particular relevance in light of the recent intensified focus on executive compensation and managerial myopia in the investment and regulatory communities.
In additional analyses, we examine whether compensation committees adjust for the reporting effects of the ASR when setting CEO pay; we find no evidence of adjustment, consistent with the managerial entrenchment exhibited by these firms. We also examine whether ASRs impair the long-run performance of firms; our findings are inconclusive, consistent with Bowen et al. (2006) , who similarly document a link between managerial opportunism and poor governance yet are unable to document
were not required to issue additional stock to the investment bank. A chi-squared test reveals that this difference in settlement patterns is highly significant (χ2 = 26.76, p <= 0.0001) and is consistent with companies choosing to settle in cash to avoid issuing additional shares that further dilute EPS. This pattern of settlement strongly suggests that ASR firms are concerned with the financial reporting effects of the forward contract.
deleterious subsequent firm performance. However, we caution that the lack of results in these two analyses may be due to low statistical power stemming from small sample size. N=21,499 . Number of non-repurchasers = 17,968; number of repurchasers = 3,531. CFO equals operating cash flows, divided by assets, at t-1; CASH equals cash and cash equivalents, divided by assets, at t-1; MKBK equals the ratio of the market value of equity plus debt to the book value of assets at t-1; PAYOUT equals cash dividends divided by net income before extraordinary items at t-1; SIZE equals the log of total assets at t-1; RETURN equals the one-year stock return from year-end t-2 to year-end t-1; LEVER equals the difference between a firm's net debt-to-asset ratio (where net debt equals debt minus cash) and the median net debt-to-asset ratio of all firms with the same two-digit SIC code at t-1; DILUTION equals the difference between the shares outstanding used to calculate diluted earnings per share and basic earnings per share, divided by the latter at t-1. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. P-values in Panel A are based on two-sided t-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. REP is the dollar volume of repurchases divided by the prior year-end market value of equity, truncated at 1%. ACCRETIVE equals 1 if the repurchase is accretive to diluted EPS by one cent or more for the fiscal quarter of the repurchase and 0 otherwise. BONUS equals 1 if EPS if explicitly mentioned in the firm's proxy statement as one of the determinants of annual cash bonuses and 0 otherwise. TURNOVER equals 1 if the CEO voluntarily leaves the firm in the year following the repurchase and 0 otherwise. COB equals 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board and 0 otherwise. NOISE is the ratio of the standard deviation in return on assets to the standard deviation of stock returns, measured over the five-year period preceding the repurchase. MTR is the firm's marginal tax rate. STRING is the number of consecutive quarters prior to the announcement date of the share repurchase that the firm has met or exceeded the benchmark of the prior year's EPS for the same fiscal quarter, up to a maximum of 20 quarters. SALESGROWTH is measured annually. All variables are measured in the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement, except where indicated, and are winsorized at 1% and 99%. P-values for BONUS, TURNOVER, and COB are based on two-tailed test of differences in population proportions; p-values for differences in means are based on twotailed t-tests; p-values for differences in medians are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon tests. 
EPS is diluted EPS (Compustat data item #57)
. EPSASR is diluted EPS with the numerator adjusted for the time-weighted interest earned on the cash used in the repurchase and the denominator adjusted by the time-weighted number of shares repurchased. ΔEPS is current year's diluted EPS minus lagged diluted EPS, divided by lagged diluted EPS. ΔEPSASR is EPSASR minus lagged diluted EPS, divided by lagged diluted EPS. SIZE is the log of the market value of equity. P-values are presented in parentheses. Operating performance is measured as operating income scaled by cash-adjusted assets at the beginning and end of the fiscal quarter. Quarter 0 is the announcement quarter. Industry adjusted performance is the difference between the operating performance of the sample firms and the operating performance of their respective date, industry and asset matched firm. OMRs used in this analysis are those that repurchase shares totaling at least one percent of total assets in the same quarter as the repurchase announcement. a and b denote that the mean or median is different than zero at the .01 and .10 level, respectively. ***, **, * indicates that ASRs are significantly different from OMRs at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
